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ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, a plethora of books and papers on
socially responsible design has emerged. This
literature, however, is far from having solved the
environmental and social problems faced by the
world today. This paper focuses on a major
problem of socially responsible design initiatives,
namely that, although they may have the best
intentions, they often have minimal, if any, positive
impact. A central reason for this is the uncertainties
associated with the effects of such designs, which is
also often used as an argument against initiating
more ambitious projects. More specifically,
sometimes we are unsure about what effects a
socially responsible design will produce, and
sometimes we are unsure or disagree about whether
its effects are ethically sound, in particular, when
they involve someone having to make sacrifices. To
be able to choose a more ambitious path, we need to
better understand the uncertainties associated with
socially responsible designs and to reconsider the
ethical assumptions guiding our choices. This issue
is addressed by defining a framework for
understanding uncertainties associated with such

Victor Papanek (1971) was one of the first authors to
address the social responsibility of (industrial)
designers from an environmentalist perspective in the
beginning of the 1970s. Since then a plethora of books
and papers related to socially responsible design has
emerged. Examples of design philosophies intended to
improve the wellbeing of humans or the environment
include design activism, design ethics, ecological
design, environmental design, environmentally
sustainable design, environmentally conscious design,
emotionally durable design, ethical design, green
design, nudging approaches, responsible design, social
design, sustainable design, triple bottom line and
welfare design. However, this literature is far from
having solved the environmental and social problems
the world faces today (e.g., Stegall 2006; Fuad-Luke
2007; IPCC 2014a; IPCC 2014b).
In recent decades, various socially responsible designs
have been implemented. Many of these, however, have
had minimal effect on a global scale, and some have
even been questioned as to whether they are in fact
doing more harm than good. Table 1 shows a small
selection of the initiatives whose benefits have been
questioned. It should be emphasized that it is not the
purpose of the authors of this paper to assess whether
these criticisms are justified or not.
As shown by the examples in Table 1, sometimes
socially responsible designs fail to produce the intended
effects and/or have unforeseen negative side effects. A
central reason for this is the uncertainties associated
with the effects of such designs, which is also often
used as an argument against initiating more ambitious
projects. On this basis, the pawper raises the question:
How can we understand and address uncertainties in
socially responsible design?

projects and by arguing for a consequentialist ethics
to govern socially responsible design.
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Table 1: Examples of critiques of socially responsible designs

Initiative

Promoted as

Critique of initiative

Urban
agriculture

A means to reduce
negative effects of food
transportation.

Allocating metropolitan land to agriculture results in lower urban density levels,
which results in longer commutes, which is far more energy intensive than food
transportation (Glaeser, 2011).

Green roofs

A particularly convenient
way of making buildings
sustainable.

Rainwater runoff from green roofs transfers the pollutants seized by urban
vegetation from the atmosphere to the surrounding environment (Speak et al.,
2014).

Biofuel

A means to reduce need
for fossil fuel and
pollution.

The increase in the production of some types of biofuel may threaten biodiversity;
some types of biofuels demand more fossil energy to produce than the fossil
energy saved by using them (Pimental and Patzek, 2005; Groom et al., 2008).

Biodegradable
products

A means to reduce
environmental impact of
waste.

Biodegradable products may not be more environmentally friendly when disposed
of in landfills because of the methane gas they release when they degrade
(greenhouse effect) (Levis and Barlaz, 2011).

Vegan
clothing

A means to minimize the
need for (polluting)
animals.

Vegan leather and faux fur creates toxic discharges that contaminate local air,
water and soil; plastic-derived products are not fully biodegradable, leading to
waste issues (McCutcheon, 2013).

Using less or
more natural
materials for
packaging

A means of becoming
more environmentally
friendly.

Cutting back too much on packaging or using recycled material can result in
damaged products during shipping because of smaller durability, which leads to
wasted energy and natural resources; the production process for a paper shopping
bag, compared to a standard plastic bag, demands more energy and water, and it
releases more greenhouse gases (Porter, 2013).

A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING
UNCERTAINTIES IN SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE DESIGN

Uncertainty in relation to socially responsible design
pertains to both the actual effects (epistemic
uncertainty) and the desirability of such effects (ethical
uncertainty). In other words, sometimes we are unsure
about what effects a socially responsible design will
produce, and sometimes we are unsure or disagree about
whether its effects are desirable, in particular, when they
involve someone having to make sacrifices by having to
pay for such solutions (e.g., through taxes) or by
eliminating or minimizing certain activities (e.g., using
public transportation instead of driving). To be able to
choose a more ambitious path, we need to better
understand the uncertainties associated with socially
responsible designs and to reconsider the ethical
assumptions guiding our choices. To facilitate an
understanding of such uncertainties, this paper
introduces three definitions.
The first definition concerns a distinction between focus
and side effects, and one between direct and indirect
effects. Focus effects refer to the effects that a solution
aims to achieve, while side effects refer to other positive
or negative effects. Direct effects refer to the actual
effects of a solution, while indirect effects refer to the
lost effects of another solution that the chosen solution
takes the attention or resources away from. Using these
two distinctions, four types of potential negative effects
from well-intended socially responsible designs can be
defined, as illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Types of negative effects of socially responsible initiatives

The four negative effect types shown in Figure 1 can be
defined as:
1) Negative direct focus effects: Aiming to achieve an
effect in one area, but eventually doing more harm
than good in this area. For example, using more
fossil energy to produce biofuel than the saved
fossil energy as a result of using the biofuel.
2) Negative direct side effects: Aiming to achieve an
effect in one area, but by doing so, doing harm in
another area. For example, using less packaging
material to save resources, but in effect causing
more products to be damaged, and thereby wasting
other types of resources, as well as causing troubles
for individuals and companies.

3) Negative indirect focus effects: Aiming to achieve
an effect in one area, but by doing so, blocking for
more efficient initiatives in this area. For example,
focusing on certain types of alternative energy
sources at the expense of more efficient ones.
4) Negative indirect side effects: Aiming to achieve an
effect in one area, but by doing so, blocking for
initiatives in other areas more in need of attention.
For example, every time funds are given to
sustainable initiatives addressing one area, at least
in principle, it is at the expense of using these funds
on initiatives addressing other areas, which some
may consider to be more important.
The second definition concerns the notion of risk, which
may help us understand why initiatives that produce
undesired effects are carried out. According to Hansson
(2004), there is a tendency to use the concept of risk to
denote any of the following: 1) an unwanted event that
may or may not occur; 2) the cause of an unwanted
event that may or may not occur; 3) the probability of an
unwanted event that may or may not occur; 4) the
statistical expectation value of unwanted events that may
or may not occur; and 5) the fact that a decision is made
under conditions of unknown probabilities. It is not the
purpose of this paper to decide between each of these
suggested usages that Hansson found in the literature, but
it should be highlighted that risk, as it pertains to actions
and their impact, can originate both in cases where the
probabilities of different outcomes are known and in
cases where they are not.
For any action that is carried out, there is always a
chance that outcomes different from those expected
might occur. Some of the causes for this will be within
our range of knowledge (safe range of prediction) and/or
control, but some will not be. Because of the probability
that can be assigned to each of these outcomes, there is a
risk connected with the action, namely the risk of an
outcome that was not intended by choosing that action.
In worse cases, we may have a grasp of the possible
outcomes of an action, but have no idea about the
probabilities of the outcomes. In fact, there may be even
worse scenarios, namely those where we do not have a
full grasp of the possible outcomes of an action that we
take. In those cases we do not know whether we have
taken every possible harmful outcome into consideration
(Sahlin and Persson 1994). Although it may seem that
such actions would be few and far between, it takes little
imagination to recognize that in fact many if not all of
our actions have uncertain outcomes. The causal chain
initiated by any action stretches out in time, i.e., into the
future where we (sometimes) have absolutely no clue
what the long-term effects of any action might be.
In the context of socially responsible design, obviously,
it is impossible to know the exact probabilities of
different outcomes in advance, for which reason acting
under some degree of uncertainty is unavoidable.
Unfortunately, however, such uncertainty is often used

as an argument against acting at all, resulting in
necessary initiatives remaining unrealized. Furthermore,
as mentioned earlier, there is also an ethical aspect, in
the sense that efficient solutions often require someone
to make certain sacrifices. The problem in this context is
that we often cannot agree upon what is fair. To be able
to implement more ambitions solutions, we therefore
need to address epistemic and ethical uncertainties.
Based on the discussion above, five types of
uncertainties may be derived, as illustrated in Figure 2

Figure 2: Uncertainties in socially responsible design

The third definition concerns ethics. According to
d’Anjou (2010), ethics in the design disciplines has
essentially been articulated around notions that from an
overall perspective correspond to Kantian
(deontological ethics) and Aristotelian (virtue ethics)
perspectives, where the Kantian perspective is the most
common in relation to professional codes of ethics and
practice. D’Anjou, in turn, argues that Sartre’s view of
ethics has to be seized as a possible foundation for
design ethics. Although the authors of this paper
sympathize with d’Anjou that it is unlikely that the
solution of the deepest moral dilemmas may be
forthcoming, there may more to say, and that given a
more consequentialist oriented perspective, we can also
make headway towards making better-founded moral
choices in design.
The examples in Table 1 make it vivid that in many
cases the attempt to obtain outcomes with ethical
consequences of one type has ramifications for an
ethically important goal of a different type. That we do
have coexisting and sometimes conflicting ethical aims
is not new, but it is not immediately transparent in an
Aristotelian, Kantian or a Sartrean view of ethics. On
the other hand, consequentialist ethics neatly captures
our predicament as moral agents with multiple moral
responsibilities and goals. Consequentialism is the
ethical theory that tells you that the moral goodness of
an action is a function of the consequences of that
action. Consequently, the morally best action is the
action with the best outcome. However, this generalized
formulation does not define ‘the scope of relevant
outcomes’ and what constitutes a ‘best outcome’, i.e.,
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what the moral measure should be. In the variety of
consequentialist theory, we find different candidates in
the history of philosophy. For example, Mill’s utilitarian
theory advises us to maximize utility, meaning that the
goodness of an act becomes relative to its effect on the
total happiness: “actions are right in proportion as they
tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to
produce the reverse of happiness” (with ‘happiness’
roughly defined as pleasure and absence of pain) (Mill
1861). A related but more recent concept is that of
wellbeing, sometimes understood in terms of ‘quality of
life’. From modern positive psychology we find the
vocabulary of preference satisfaction, or simply
satisfaction, measured on a numeric scale. In
economics, outcomes are weighed against one another
in terms of monetary value. Indeed, one of the major
obstacles for modern economics is setting values for
such diverse outcomes as environmental catastrophes,
species extinctions, the pollution of a lake, and quality
human life years.
Socially responsible design is premised on the
assumption that the values, which we have identified
and seek to promote, are in fact the right ones to
promote. But, of course, it is a rare occurrence that the
benefits of a design can be harvested without any
negative costs — and not all values can be put on the
same scale, for example, the value of living a stress-free
life, enjoying the benefits of beautiful surroundings, and
the freedom to practice ones religion of choice or the
religious value assigned to a plot of land. Furthermore,
because the decisions carried out often have
consequences way beyond those relating to the decision
makers themselves, there are a number of moral
questions that immediately present themselves in this
connection. If a cost-benefit analysis is carried out, and
the benefits of a design is considered to outweigh the
possible costs (i.e., the risk of harm), there may still be a
problem if harm befalls a number of people who are not
involved in the decision to implement the design in
question. If people, who are not decision makers, are
potentially negatively affected by a design, they only
carry the risk of the project without any expected
benefit from it, which can pose a moral wrong (Altham,
1984). This is an issue that should be considered
especially in situations in which there are potential
negative indirect consequences, as this type of
consequence is the one that we are most likely not to
take into consideration.
When we isolate one aim as the one to promote, or
isolate a possible outcome as the most important to
avoid, we are in serious risk of aiming blindly. When
we are interested in enhancing the good of an overall
population, we may at the same time decrease the
goodness for particular individuals of that population
and individuals outside of the population whose
intended good we were aiming for. This again raises the
issue as to how this should feature in a consequentialist
ethics for socially responsible design. Solutions to such
problems should include making the harmed persons’
4

interests count to an even degree against those in the
chosen population – even when those harmed are not
part of this population. Harmed people should be
compensated in other ways, or solutions should be
chosen that even out costs and benefits. If, on the other
hand, we do not allow the goodness of the population to
be increased at the expense of someone inside or outside
of that population, we can ask ourselves if it is possible
at all to solve the problems at hand.
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